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II
ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF HANDLING ADMINISTRATION EXPENSES
FOR INCOME AND ESTATE TAX PURPOSES 1
Edmund J. Durkin, Jr.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
For many years prior to 1942, a broad construction prevailed govern-
ing the nature of the deduction for "ordinary and necessary expenses paid
or incurred in the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business."
Undoubtedly many administration expenses incurred in the handling of
an estate were successfully deducted as ordinary and necessary expenses.
The circumstance that the same deduction was taken for both income and
estate tax was not regarded as material.2 A more critical approach and
a more restrictive construction was adopted by the Supreme Court in a
series of cases decided in 1941.' They held that not all expenses of every
business transaction are deductible. Only those expenses are deductible
which relate to the carrying on of a business.
The denial of expenses which were reasonably required to produce
income on the ground that they were not technically "incurred in a trade
or business" ultimately led to statutory reform, and in 1942 the law was
amended to create a new deduction described by the statute in a not too
revealing fashion as a "non-trade and non-business expense."4
At this point, administrative expenses incurred by an estate would
have been deductible under the estate tax law as an administrative ex-
pense and under the income tax law as a non-trade or non-business ex-
pense. To circumvent the grant of a double deduction, section 161 (a)
of the 1942 Act added section 162 (e) to the 1939 Code (now section
6 4 2 (g) of the 1954 Code) to deny the income tax deduction for non-
trade and non-business expenses in computing the net income of an es-
tate, unless a waiver is filed giving up the right to take such expenses as
a deduction for estate tax purposes.
1. There is an increasing amount of literature on this topic. See particularly Cox, Executor's
Election to Claim Certain Deductions for Income or Estate Tax Purposes, 20 OHIO ST. LJ.
23 (1959); Gradwohl, Current Issues in Probate Estate Income Tax Allocation, 37 NEB. L.
REV. 329 (1958); Randall, Consequences of Executor's Elections as to Administrative Ex-
penses, N.Y.U. 15TH INST. ON FED. TAx 1011 (1957).
2. Brown v. Commissioner, 74 F.2d 281, 286 (10th Cir. 1934), reversing 29 B.T.A. 1183;
Robert Kleberg, 31 B.T.A. 95 (1934).
3. United States v. Pyne, 313 U.S. 127 (1941); City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Helvering,
313 U.S. 121 (1941); Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212 (1941).
4. See § 121 of the 1942 Act adding § 23(a) (2) to the 1939 Code (now § 212 of the
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954).
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It should be noted at the outset that under our present scheme of tax-
ing estate income, the benefit of the deduction does not necessarily inure
to the benefit of the party bearing the expense. Administrative expenses
in the normal case would be properly chargeable to the capital account
and would, therefore, diminish the amount of the corpus of the estate.
The deductions granted under the 1942 Act for income tax purposes, for
those expenses of administration which can classify as non-trade or non-
business expenses, are not limited to the expenses which are properly
chargeable to income, and the deduction is allowable regardless of the
source of the payment of the expenses. In other words, if the election is
made by filing the waiver, the estate is given a deduction on its income
tax return for certain payments, the benefit of which would in many cases
inure to the life tenant or other income beneficiaries. Because of the
specific provision of 64 2 (g), where this right is exercised, the deduction
for estate tax purposes is denied to the estate and, accordingly, the remain-
derman is left to bear not only the administrative expense, but also the
increased estate tax brought about by the disallowance of such expenses
as an estate tax deduction.
The paradoxical result of allowing the benefit of tax deductions for
income tax purposes to parties not bearing the expenses and denying the
benefit of the deductions for estate tax purposes to parties bearing ex-
penses has not entirely escaped the attention of the courts and the begin-
nings of a system of case law requiring a more equitable sharing of tax
burdens granted by the Code is now emerging.5
NATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES
INVOLVED IN THE ELECTION
The term "administration expenses" is not used in the income tax
statute. That term is an estate tax term, and only those administration
expenses which fall within the statutory concept of "non-trade and non-
business expenses" are deductible for income tax purposes, the prohibition
of double deduction being for those amounts allowable under section
2053 as an administration expense. It was evidently the intent of Con-
gress that in liberalizing the income tax provisions, it wished to make
the increased estate tax revenues pay for part of the cost of income
tax reform. In this they were not wholly successful, partly because of the
form of the legislation and partly as a result of subsequent legislation.
In some circumstances the effect of the election of the income tax deduc-
tion is to increase the amount of other estate tax deductions, such as the
marital deduction, and in other cases Congress failed to prevent the dou-
ble deduction.
5. See discussion p. 159.
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In general, a liberal construction has been adopted by the Service,
and its practice is to allow substantially all administrative expenses in-
curred in the normal administration of an estate as deductions for income
tax purposes where the proper election is made; for example, executors'
commissions and attorneys' fees, caretaker or custodian expenses paid
during administration, court costs and appraisers' fees.6 While section
642(g) only refers to deductions, the Service has adopted the position
that expenses of sale which are not properly a deduction at all, but con-
stitute an amount applied in diminution of the sale proceeds in determin-
ing the gain, are to be treated as deductions subject to the requirements
of section 64 2(g).7
It is obvious that some administrative expenses, though properly de-
ductible for estate tax purposes, would not fall within the classification
of non-trade or non-business deductions as, for instance, the example giv-
en in the Regulations of fees paid in a suit to quiet title, which expenses
have historically been treated as capital expenses.
Even though the general statutory intent is clear that an administra-
tive expense is not to be deducted for both income and estate tax pur-
poses, there are exceptions. An exception is explicitly made by section
64 2(g) allowing deductions for income in respect of a decedent to be
deducted for both estate and income tax purposes.' Since the income in
respect of a decedent is being subjected to both income tax and estate tax,
it was appropriate to exempt these expenses from the election and to
make it dear that they were deductible under both taxes. The second
exception app ears in the case of non-probate assets. Since the federal
estate tax applies not only to the probate estate, but includes many items
which are not in the probate estate, all of which have their share of ad-
ministrative expenses, an interesting question is posed as to whether ad-
ministrative expenses incurred with respect to such costs are deductible
for income tax purposes. Such expenses are deductible as administration
expenses for estate tax purposes, either directly as deductions, or indirectly
by merely including the net proceeds, and there would appear to be no
logical reason to distinguish such expenses from others which are subject
to the restrictions imposed by the election. A reading of the pertinent
parts of the Committee Reports on the 1942 Act would lead one to be-
lieve that the question never occurred to Congress. As noted above, the
existence of a deduction for administration expenses under section 2053
for estate purposes and under section 212 for income tax purposes is
6. See letter dated May 24, 1954, signed by Lester W. Utter, Chief, Individual Income Tax
Branch, reported in 4 P-H 1954 FED. TAx SERV. 5 76,782, and discussion in 4 MERTENS,
LAW OF FEDERAL GiFT AND EsTATiE TAXATION 243 (1959).
7. Rev. Rul. 58-436, 1958-2 CuM. BULL. 336.
8. See discussion p. 147.
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perfectly dear, and the expenses are deductible under both taxes unless
specifically limited by the election requirement of section 642 (g). Sec-
tion 642(g) refers to a deduction allowable in computing "the taxable
income of the estate." The omission of the words "or the trust" in sec-
tion 642 (g) is a significant one. It points up an important advantage
in the use of inter vivos trusts since it should be possible to secure admin-
istrative expenses relating to such trusts, includible in the gross estate, as
a deduction both for estate and income tax purposes.' A comparable case
would be expenses of jointly held property.
TAx FACTORS TO CONSIDER IN MAKING ELECTION
Fortunately, the executor is not required to elect to take the entire de-
duction either for estate or for income tax purposes. The statute merely
prevents the same dollar amounts being deducted for both taxes. A de-
duction, such as the one for executors' commissions, may be deducted in
part for estate tax purposes and in part for income tax purposes. "One
deduction or portion of a deduction may be allowed for income tax pur-
poses if the appropriate statement is filed, while another deduction or por-
tion is allowed for estate tax purposes."'".
Timing is obviously an important element in taking advantage of
the income tax deduction since most estates report their income on a
cash receipts and disbursements method of accounting. It may be of con-
siderably greater advantage to spread the administrative deductions over
the high income tax brackets of each year, or in a case where the income
of the estate is not as great as the income of the beneficiary, it may be
well to postpone the payment of the administrative expenses until the
final year of the estate, at which time the portion of the deduction in
excess of the income of the estate may be of substantial benefit to bene-
ficiaries in a high income tax bracket.
EFFECT OF THE DEDUCTION UPON THE MARITAL DEDUCTION
Where a marital deduction is involved in an estate, the situation is
replete with uncertainties and complications. Looked at solely from a
tax standpoint, the advantage of obtaining a deduction for administration
expenses in the income tax return is a substantial one since income tax
brackets are considerably higher than estate tax brackets. If the deduc-
tion of administration expenses for income tax purposes results in the dis-
allowance of administrative expenses for estate tax purposes, as would
be the case where an estate rather than a trust is involved, the effect of
9. See Casner, Estate Planning - Avoidance of Probate, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 110, 130 n.85
(1960).
10. Treas. Reg. § 1.642(g)-2.
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the denial of the deduction for estate tax purposes would be to increase
the adjusted gross estate. If the adjusted gross estate is larger, then the
potential marital deduction is also larger, since the marital deduction is
available up to a maximum of one-half of the adjusted gross estate. There-
fore, the first step in dealing with an estate which involves a marital de-
duction will be to take the administration expense as a deduction on the
income tax return. As a result, the estate tax will be increased since no
deduction for administration expense will be allowed. However, approx-
imately one-half of the deduction will be regained because of the in-
creased marital deduction.
Whether the increased marital deduction is allowable to the surviv-
ing spouse depends upon whether she is entitled to receive the property
up to the additional amount of the possible marital deduction. In a sim-
ple case where there is no will and the widow inherits an intestate share
(one-half of the net estate where there is one child), a proportionate
share of the administration expenses and the estate taxes are deducted in
computing the amount receivable by the widow. If the administrator
elects to deduct the administration expenses in the income tax return of
the estate, the estate will be denied the deduction of administration ex-
penses for income tax purposes under the provisions of section 642 (g).
It is true that since the estate becomes larger by reason of the disallow-
ance of the deduction for administration expenses and, therefore, one-half
of the adjusted gross estate is larger, there would be no increased marital
deduction by reason of the increased adjusted gross estate, due to the fact
that the widow is not entitled to inherit property up to one-half of the
adjusted gross estate since she has to bear her proportionate share of the
tax and the administration expenses." The marital deduction cannot be
greater than an amount equal to the value of property which passes to the
surviving spouse.
If there is a will and the surviving spouse is entitled to one-half of the
residue, i.e. the net estate after the payment of taxes and administration
expenses, the situation is the same.' Where, however, the will contains
a marital deduction formula clause, the extent of the interest passing to
the surviving spouse becomes a question of interpretation under state
law. For example, if the will provides that the surviving spouse is en-
titled to receive that amount of property which will equal the maximum
marital deduction obtainable under the provisions of the Internal Reve-
nue Code, it is clear that the effect of the election to deduct administra-
tive expenses in the income tax return would be to increase the amount
11. Campbell v. Lloyd, 162 Ohio St. 203, 122 N.E.2d 695 (1954); Estate of Newton B. T.
Roney, 33 T.C. No. 89 (Jan. 29, 1960); cf. Estate of Edward H. Luebrmann, 33 T.C. No.
32 (Nov. 18, 1959).
12. See Rev. Rul. 55-643, 1955-2 CUM. BULL. 386; Rev. Rul. 55-225, 1955-1 CuM. BULL.
460.
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of the adjusted gross estate, and, therefore, to increase the amount of the
maximum marital deduction. Since it is dear that the testator intended
the surviving spouse to have this amount, the additional marital deduc-
tion would be obtained.
A comparable case would be a bequest of one-half of the adjusted
gross estate, as finally determined for federal estate tax purposes, where
the administration expenses were actually deducted for income tax pur-
poses."3 Where the form of the bequest to the surviving spouse is an
amount equal to the maximum possible marital deduction and where the
executor fails to exercise his election of deducting the administration ex-
penses in the income tax return, it does not necessarily follow that the
surviving spouse is only entitled to receive an amount equal to the actual
marital deduction, which was in fact allowed in the case. She could very
well contend that her inheritance was fixed at the maximum amount
which could have been obtained as a marital deduction, taking into con-
sideration the provisions of the entire Code, including the provisions of
section 642 (g), and that the clear words of the grant should not be frus-
trated by the failure of the executor to exercise his statutory rights. In
addition to this, she would also be in a position to complain about the
conduct of the executor in failing to obtain significant tax savings. The
wording of the bequest to the surviving spouse is obviously crucial. If,
for example, the provision in the will gave to the surviving spouse an
amount equal to one-half the adjusted gross estate, as defined by section
2056 of the Internal Revenue Code, it might very well be argued that
the disallowance of the administrative expenses for estate tax purposes,
due to the operation of section 642 (g), does not increase the marital de-
duction since the computation of the adjusted gross estate, as defined by
section 2056, is actually made after the deduction for administration ex-
penses allowed by section 2054.
A less technical interpretation of a comparable provision is adopted
by the court in In re Inman's Estate."4 In that case, the bequest was "an
amount which shall be equal to one-half ( ) in value of my 'adjusted
gross estate', as that term is defined in section 812(e) (2) of the United
States Internal Revenue Code." The court refused to reduce the widow's
share of the estate and concluded that the purpose in using the terms of
the Internal Revenue Code indicated an intent to obtain the fullest tax
benefit and not merely to create a trust of one-half a residuary estate.
This interpretation would be more readily acceptable if a reference had
been made to the Internal Revenue Code in its entirety rather than to a
specific provision of it. The Inman case is difficult to reconcile with In
13. In re McTarnahan's Estate, 202 N.Y.S.2d 618 (Surr. Ct. 1960).
14. 22 Misc. 2d 573, 196 N.Y.S.2d 369 (Surf, Ct 1959).
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re Levy's Estate,5 where the bequest referred to a sum equivalent to one-
half of the adjusted gross estate. Here the court stated "the election per-
mitted by the Internal Revenue Code does not authorize the executors to
vary the interest of the legatees."
The form of the marital deduction clause frequently makes the mat-
ter turn on the marital deduction as finally determined for estate tax pur-
poses. In this type of case, the bequest is dependent upon what is actual-
ly done by the executor in exercising or failing to exercise the election."6
If the election to deduct the expenses in the income tax return is chosen,
the marital deduction is increased because the gross estate is greater. If,
however, the deduction is not taken for income tax purposes, the adjusted
gross estate is necessarily reduced by the administration expense, and the
surviving spouse would be entitled to the lesser amount.
ALLOCATION OF BENEFITS AND BURDENS
WHERE ELECTION IS EXERCISED
The fact that the executor chooses to deduct administration expenses
against the income of the estate pertains solely to the question of federal
income tax law and does not affect the normal rule of probate accounting
which would make the estate tax a proper charge against the corpus.
Considered solely from a tax standpoint, the effect of the exercise of the
election would be to prefer the income beneficiaries against the remain-
dermen, since the income beneficiaries receive the benefit of the deduc-
tion without having the expenses charged against income, thus giving
them an estate income pro tanto tax free. The remaindermen have the
burden of the estate tax to pay, bearing an increased estate tax because
of the provisions of section 64 2(g) which prohibit the deduction for
estate tax purposes where the election has been made.
The question confronting fiduciaries is, briefly, should the problem
be left at this point, leaving the beneficial interests to be determined by
the actual tax liabilities? It is a dilemma for fiduciaries since the re-
maindermen have a cause for complaint if the tax saving of the income
beneficiaries is produced in part at their expense. Many fiduciaries feel
that the remaindermen are entitled to be reimbursed by the income bene-
ficiaries to the extent of their loss of the benefit of the estate tax deduc-
tion for administrative expenses. If the remainderman is so reimbursed,
the life tenant is benefited solely at the expense of the government and
not at the expense of both government and the remainderman. There
is little authority on this subject, but there have been sufficient decisions
to date to indicate a settlement along these lines.
15. 9 Misc. 2d 561, 167 N.Y.S.2d 16 (Surr. Ct. 1957).
16. In re McTarnahan's Estate, 202 N.Y.S.2d 618 (Surr. Ct. 1960).
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The matter is by no means settled, however, and the suggestion has
been made that the solution of merely leaving the remaindermen un-
scathed is insufficient, on the theory that the tax saving should belong to
the entire estate and not be preempted by the income beneficiaries or the
surviving spouse. The early decisions, In re Warms' Estate," In re
Bixby's Estate"8 and In re Rice's Estate,'" considered the question as be-
tween the remaindermen and the income beneficiaries, no marital deduc-
tion being involved. The conclusion of the courts was that the income
beneficiaries were required to repay the damage done to the remainder-
men through the exercise of the election, out of their savings. In In re
Levy's Estate2 the court, on the issue as between the life tenant and the
remainderman, followed the Warms, Bixby and Rice cases.
It is obvious that the dilemma presented to the fiduciaries could be
avoided by the foresight of the draftsman. It is not, however, always
possible to determine whether the administrative expense deduction
would result in greater tax savings in the income tax return or in the es-
tate tax return, and in such cases it would be well to leave the matter to
be decided at the discgetion of the executor. The relationship of the
executor to the beneficiaries would be greatly simplified and litigation
avoided if the will spelled out the decedent's intention as to the rear-
rangement of property interests arising out of the exercise of the election.
This is particularly important where the marital deduction is involved
since the adjusted gross estate, which is the basis for the computation of
the marital deduction, is directly affected by the exercise of the election
and also because the judicial doctrine requiring a contribution from the
life tenant to meet the increased estate tax, resulting from the exercise
of the election, affects the amount of property passing to the surviving
spouse and thus may act as an additional limitation upon the marital
deduction.
17. 140 N.Y.S.2d 169 (Surr. Ct. 1955).
18. 140 Cal. App. 2d 326, 295 P.2d 68 (1956).
19. 8 Pa. D. & C.2d 379 (Orphans' Ct. 1956).
20. 9 Misc. 2d 561, 167 N.Y.S.2d 16 (Surr. Ct. 1957).
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